Iran talks are grinding through their second round with little sign of convergence. Both sides remain dug into positions that have barely moved, while the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly 20% of global oil shipments, keeps energy markets on edge. The political pressure at home is intensifying in parallel. Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly have each broken publicly with the administration over its foreign policy direction, visible signals that the MAGA base is growing restless.
The contrast with Trump’s first term deserves close attention.
What John McEntee Did in Term One
During the final stretch of the first Trump administration, a small group of White House aides worked to challenge the Pentagon and National Security Council from inside the building. John McEntee, then director of the Presidential Personnel Office, was the most consequential among them. Working alongside retired Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor, McEntee drafted a set of end-of-term foreign policy directives, with a full Afghanistan withdrawal at the top. The effort bypassed traditional defense channels, which fiercely resisted rapid disengagement. These events are documented in Jonathan Karl’s reporting, excerpts of which appeared in Vanity Fair.
The institutional resistance largely succeeded. Pentagon officials blocked most of the proposed withdrawals, though troop reductions in Somalia did proceed. The outcome mattered less than what the effort demonstrated: a White House official willing to use his position to directly confront the national security establishment on behalf of a president whose stated instincts favored withdrawal.
How the Second Term’s Foreign Policy Team Differs
The second term does not have that internal counterweight.
JD Vance, long positioned as a voice for the non-interventionist wing of the MAGA movement, has reportedly taken a more hawkish posture in internal discussions than his public profile suggested. Marco Rubio’s interventionist Senate record presented no surprises. Steve Witkoff, tasked with Iran negotiations alongside Jared Kushner, has pursued a framework demanding full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, a position that tracks longstanding U.S. policy rather than departing from it.
Secretary Rubio’s absence from the first round of Iran talks drew its own attention: he was at a UFC event with Trump while negotiations were underway. The more telling detail is the ideological consistency across the current foreign policy apparatus. There is no real internal faction advocating for disengagement. The people around Trump on foreign policy largely agree with each other, and that consensus runs toward continued engagement.
The Base Has Moved; The White House Has Not
Pew Research Center surveys conducted over the past decade document a steady rise in support for reducing overseas military commitments, a shift that has moved fastest on the political right. The position McEntee and MacGregor were arguing for in 2020 was, at that moment, a minority view even within Republican politics. It has since become a defining feature of the MAGA movement’s identity.
The loudest voices articulating that position are now outside the administration. Carlson and Kelly speak for a real constituency. Inside the White House, that constituency has no clear advocate. The longer the Iran situation persists without resolution, the more visible that gap becomes between what Trump’s coalition believes and what the people surrounding Trump are actually doing.
